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ERISA's "Bad Boy": Forfeiture For Cause In 
Retirement Plans 
JOHN W. LEE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974 (ERISA), 1 retirement plans2 frequently contained 
"bad boy" clauses which denied former plan participants their oth-
erwise nonforfeitable retirement benefits if they were discharged for 
cause3 or if they competed with their former employer after termina-
tion of employment. 4 Although the Internal Revenue Service speci-
• Partner with the firm of Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen in Richmond, 
Virginia. A.B., University of North Carolina, 1965; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968; 
LL.M., Georgetown University, 1970. 
l. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (l974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 31, 42 U.S.C.). As enacted, ERISA 
comprises four titles: Title I (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144) contains the sections estab-
lishing employee benefit rights administered by the Secretary of Labor; Title II (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) contains amendments to the Internal Revenue Code; Title 
III concerns jurisdiction, administration and enforcement; and Title IV creates an insurance 
system for plan terminations. Titles I and II contain virtually identical language regarding 
plan participation, vesting, and funding. Though different consequences do flow from viola-
tions of the two sets of provisions, e.g., ERISA§ 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V 1975), grants 
a private civil cause of action, the primary reason for the extensive overlap in Titles I and II 
probably sterns from the jurisdictional disputes between the tax and labor committees of both 
the House and Senate. See Lee, The "Elaborate Interweaving of Jurisdiction": Labor and Tax 
Administration and Enforcement of ERISA and Beyond, 10 RicH. L. REv. 463, 466 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Lee]. 
2. The term "retirement plan" will be used herein interchangeably with "employee pen-
sion benefit plan," see ERISA § 3 (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2) (Supp. V 1975), to refer to both 
pension plans that provide retirement income, and profit sharing plans that usually provide 
a deferral of income. The chief characteristic of a defined benefit pension plan is that the 
promise made by the employer concerns the ultimate retirement benefits to be paid the 
employees who participate in the plan. See ERISA, § 3 (35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (35) (Supp. V 
1975); I.R.C. § 414 (j). Under a defined contribution profit sharing plan, on the other hand, 
the most constant variable in the pension promise concerns the amount of contributions to 
be made to the plan by the employer. See ERISA, § 3 (34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (34) (Supp. V. 
1975); I.R.C. § 414 (i). In the former the employer bears the risk of investment loss, while in 
the latter the investment risk is borne by the participants. 
3. The term "participant" is defined as: 
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member 
of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of 
any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer 
or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive 
any such benefit. 
ERISA, § 3 (7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (7) (Supp. V 1975). 
The term "cause" refers to activities such as excessive absenteeism, insubordination or 
fighting on the job, which commonly provide the basis for a discharge. 
4. See generally text accompanying notes 146 through 178 infra. 
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tied certain restrictions on the operation of bad boy clauses, 5 the 
Service did not prohibit them entirely. Furthermore, anticompeti-
tive forfeiture provisions were not prohibited by either the Internal 
Revenue Code, 6 the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 
1958,7 or the federal antitrust laws. 8 In the absence of federal regula-
tion before ERISA, state law alone determined the enforceability of 
bad boy clauses. On the eve of ERISA, the majority of states upheld 
such clauses.9 
Under section 514 of ERISA, 10 the provisions of Title I of ERISA 
5. I.R.C. § 401 establishes the general requirements that a plan must meet to achieve 
"qualified" status. Plan qualification results in the following: (1) deferral of taxation for the 
participant, see 26 U.S.C. § 402 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); (2) current deductions for the 
contributing employer though taxation to the participant is deferred, see 26 U.S.C. § 404 
(1970 & Supp. V 1975); and (3) exemption from taxation for the trust forming part of the 
plan, see I.R.C. § 501 (a). 
Pre-ERISA pronouncements from the Service acknowledged that a qualified plan might 
limit or entirely discontinue benefits to an employee discharged for cause. See IRS, U.S. 
Treasury Dep't, Publication No. 778, Guides for Qualification: Pension, Profit-Sharing, and 
Stock Bonus Plans, pt. 5 (c) (3) (1972). The Service did require that such bad boy clauses 
could not discriminate in favor of the prohibited group as defined in I.R.C. § 401 (a) (4)(con-
tributions or benefits provided under the plan cannot discriminate in favor of employees who 
are officers, shareholders or highly compensated). While the plan would have to distinctly 
specify the causes that would result in benefit forfeiture, terms such as misconduct and 
dishonesty did not have to be defined. See Rev. Rul. 71-92, 1971-1 C. B. 122. 
6. Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975). 
7. Lieberman v. Cook, 343 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (construing Pub. L. No. 85-836, 
76 Stat. 38 (1948) (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 301-3-9 (1970) which was repealed by ERISA). 
8. Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975); Austin v. House of Vision, 
404 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1969); Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 
1335 (N.D. Okla. 1970). 
9. Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1971). See generally 
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1968). 
10. Section 514 of ERISA provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title 
and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4 (a) and not 
exempt under section 4 (b). This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975. 
(b) (1) This section shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which arose, 
or any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975. 
(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be 
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates 
insurance, banking, or securities. 
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4 (a), which is not 
exempt under section 4 (b) (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose 
of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be 
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or 
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for 
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insur-
ance contracts .. banks, trust companies, or investment companies. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the Secretary of 
services or facilities of a State agency as permitted under section 506 of this Act. 
(4) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal law of a 
state. 
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generally supersede all state laws relating to employee benefit plans, 
effective January 1, 1975. However, the ERISA minimum vesting 
standards are not effective for a plan in existence on January 1, 
1974, until its first plan year11 beginning after December 31, 1975.12 
Because of this potential twenty-three month delay between ERISA 
preemption of state law, 13 and the effective date of the minimum 
vesting standards the validity of bad boy provisions during this 
interim period is unclear. 
A second question concerns the continued effect of bad boy 
clauses on otherwise "vested" plan rights that exceed the require-
ments of ERISA's minimum vesting standards, after those stan-
dards become effective. 14 The basic thrust of ERISA mandates com-
pliance with minimum vesting standards for employee pension ben-
efit plans. Under these requirements, a participant's accrued bene-
fit15 derived from employer contributions becomes "nonforfeitable" 
upon the occurrence of certain events. Usually, the controlling event 
will be·the completion of a specified number of years of service18 with 
(c) For purposes of this section: 
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other 
State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States 
applicable only to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather 
than a law of the United States. 
(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any 
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indi-
rectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this title. 
(d) Nothing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in sections 
111 and 507 (b)) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law. 
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. V 1975). 
11. The terms "plan year" and "fiscal year of the plan" are defined as the "calendar, 
policy or fiscal year on which the records of the plan are kept." ERISA,§ 3 (39), 29 U.S.C. § 
1002 (39) (Supp. V 1975). 
12. ERISA, § 211 (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1061 (b) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA§ 1017, I.R.C. § 410 
(historical note). 
13. In the case of a plan year ending November 30, 1976, the first plan year to which the 
minimum vesting standards applied was the fiscal year beginning December 1, 1976, 23 
months after January 1, 1975. 
14. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.411 (a)- 4 (c) (example 1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,424 (November 
5, 1975). 
15. "Accrued benefit" is defined in Title I of ERISA as: 
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the individual's accrued benefit deter-
mined under the plan and . . . expressed in the form of an annual retirement 
benefit commencing at normal retirement age, or 
(B) in the case of a plan which is an individual account plan [e.g., profit-sharing 
plans] the balance of the individual's account. 
ERISA, § 3 (23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (23) (Supp. V 1975). 
16. For purposes of determining a participant's vesting rights, Titles I and II of ERISA 
define a "year of service" as: "a calendar year, plan year, or other 12-consecutive-month 
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the employer who maintains the planY Under pre-ERISA tax law, 
the term "nonforfeitable" meant, among other things, that a vested 
interest would not be forfeited if an employee violated a bad boy 
clause. 18 This result apparently also occurs under the ERISA mini-
mum vesting standards, i.e., violation of a bad boy clause will not 
legally cause a forfeiture of a former participant's "nonforfeitable" 
accrued benefits. The congressional committee reports on ERISA 
repeatedly state, for example, that "a vested benefit is not to be 
forfeited because the employee later went to work for a competitor, 
or in some other way was considered 'disloyal' to the employer." 19 
However, in this context, "vested" apparently refers to only that 
portion of the plan rights that ERISA minimum standards require 
to be nonforfeitable. 20 Thus, it remains an open question whether a 
bad boy clause could be enforced to effect a forfeiture of plan bene-
fits that exceed the ERISA minimum vested amount. 
During the floor debate, the comments of Representative Dent, 
period designated by the plan (and not prohibited under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary [of Labor]) during which the participant has completed 1,000 hours of service." ERISA, 
§ 203 (b)(2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (b)(2) (A) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (5) (A). Special 
provisions are made for seasonal and maritime industries and regulations are to be promul-
gated by the Secretary of Labor defining the term "hour of service." Years of service are 
required to be distinguished from "years of participation" which are defined in § 411 (b) (3) 
(A) of the Internal Revenue Code: 
[f]or purposes of determining an employee's accrued benefit, ... [as) a period 
of service (beginning at the earliest date on which the employee is a participant in 
the plan and which is included in a period of service to be taken into account under 
section 410 (a) (5) [minimum participation standards]) as determined under regu-
lations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor which provide for the calculation of 
such period on any reasonable and consistent basis. 
I.R.C. § 411 (b)(3)(A). 
17. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, § 1012 (a) 
(2), I.R.C. § 411 (a) (2). Sections 203 (a) (2) and 1012 (a) (2) establish three alternative 
minimum vesting standards: (1) 10 year "cliff" vesting; (2) 5 to 15 year "graduated" vesting; 
and (3) "rule of 45" vesting. For a discussion of these alternatives see text accompanying 
notes 80-96 infra. The number of a participant's years of service are figured into his retirement 
plan's vesting schedule to obtain a percentage value. This value is then applied to the 
monetary figure which represents the participant's accrued benefits to obtain the monetary 
value of his nonforfeitable accrued benefits. 
18. See Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 62 T.C. 621 (1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Hazel v. Pollnow, 35 T.C. 715 (1961). Title I seems to define the term "nonforfeitable" to 
similar effect: "a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immedi-
ate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant's service, which 
is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan." ERISA, § 3 (19), 29 
U.S.C. § 1002 (19) (Supp. V 1975). 
19. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1973)[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 
93-383]; accord, H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
H.R. REP. No. 93-807). 
20. The language quoted in the text is merely a more narrow application of the statement 
that "no rights, once they are required to be vested, may be lost by the employee under any 
circumstances .... " S. REP. No. 93-383, note 19 supra, at 50. 
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Chairman of the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor, and a prime supporter of 
ERISA, indicate that such excess benefit forfeitures could be a pos-
sibility. "Another issue dealt with in the conference report is the 
policy against what has been described as 'bad boy' clauses. While 
firmly articulating this policy, the conferees expressly provided . . . 
that a plan be permitted to suspend benefits under certain circum-
stances.' '21 
This article will address the issues raised by the interplay of 
ERISA provisions and bad boy clauses: (1) whether state or federal 
common law governs the enforceability of bad boy clauses during 
the interim period between section 514 preemption of state law and 
the effective date of the minimum vesting standards; and (2) 
whether excess benefits can be forfeited, both during and after the 
interim period, by operation of a bad boy clause. 
Resolution of these questions requires an examination ofthe legis-
lative history of ERISA, its relevant provisions, and prior state law 
concerning forfeiture of accrued benefits. Two recent conflicting 
decisions22 that directly address the "gap" issue will be considered 
first, in order to present clearly the issues and to suggest answers to 
the second question of excess benefit forfeitures. 
POSITING THE IssuE: Amory AND Keller 
In Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 23 the plaintiff was employed 
by Boyden Associates, Inc., the plan sponsor, 24 for sixteen years. In 
July, 1975, Amory voluntarily resigned in order to work for another 
firm. At that time the vested portion of the benefits allocated to his 
account under Boyden's profit-sharing plan amounted to approxi-
mately $70,000. However, the plan contained a provision by which 
a participant's vested benefits would be forfeited if he went to work 
for a competitor within five years of termination with the plan spon-
sor. In August, 1975, the plan's managing committee25 determined 
21. 120 CoNG. REc. 29197 (1974), reprinted in III STAFF ON SuBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE 
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94 Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EMPWYEE RETiREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 4669 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
22. Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Keller v. 
Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
23. 434 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
24. A "plan sponsor" is the employer in the case of a plan maintained by a single em-
ployer. ERISA, §3(16) (B) (i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (16) (B) (i) (Supp. V 1975). If the plan does 
not otherwise provide, the plan sponsor is also the "administrator" of the plan. ld. § 3 (16) 
(A) (ii). 
25. Many pre-ERISA pension plans allocated administrative functions to a committee, 
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that Amory was employed by a competitor and accordingly sus-
pended his benefits. 
In Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 28 the plaintiff also voluntarily 
terminated his twelve years of employment and immediately went 
to work for a competitor. Keller's termination of employment oc-
curred in August, 1973, prior to any of ERISA's effective dates. 27 
However, the employer's qualified profit-sharing plan required a 
terminated employee to wait for a period of two years before vested 
benefits could be distributed. The plan also established a complete 
forfeiture of vested rights if, after termination, a participant entered 
into employment with a direct competitor of the plan sponsor. 
Keller had four full years of participation in the plan28 at the time 
of his termination, and a forty percent vested interest in his account 
balance of $11,738. In July, 1974, Keller was informed that the 
trustees intended to declare a forfeiture of his vested interest due 
to his violation of the plan's noncompetition clause. Thereafter, 
upon the expiration of the two year waiting period in August, 1975, 
Keller's counsel made a demand upon the plan trustees for payment 
of his vested interest. 29 The trustees denied Keller's claim. 
Thus, in Keller and Amory, the federal district courts30 considered 
the law applicable to "bad boy" clauses during the gap period be-
tween the effective date of the ERISA preemption provisions and 
the ERISA minimum vesting provisions and reached different re-
sults. 
commonly designated a retirement or administrative committee. This was particularly true 
when the plan had a corporate trustee. 
26. 422 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
27. The earliest ERISA effective date is June 30, 1974, ERISA, § 4082 (b) (2), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1381 (b) (2) (Supp. V 1975) (the "open window" for certain plan terminations with regard 
to ERISA termination insurance provisions). For a novel attempt to obtain ERISA jurisdic-
tion on the ground that a cause of action arose at the time of a pre-ERISA termination but 
lay dormant until September 2, 1974, the date of ERISA's enactment, see Martin v. Bankers 
Trust Co., 417 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Va. 1976). 
28. Under ERISA the nonforfeitability of accrued benefits under all pension plans (except 
"class year" plans and plans with immediate vesting) depends in part upon completion of 
"years of service," see notes 11 and 15 supra, including, with certain exceptions, years of 
service completed prior to entry into the plan. The exceptions include years of service during 
which the plan sponsor did not maintain the plan. ERISA, § 203 (b)(1) (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 
(b) (1) (c) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a) (4) (C). However, under pre-ERISA plan design, 
vesting frequently depended solely upon years of participation in the plan. 
29. Both parties agreed that Keller's cause of action arose on August 31, 1975, when 
demand for payment was made following expiration of the two year waiting period. 422 F. 
Supp. at 1007. 
30. United States district courts and state courts of competent jurisdiction have concur-
rent jurisdiction over actions to recover benefits due under a plan arising after December 31, 
1975. ERISA, §§ 502 (a) (1) (B), (e) (1), 514 (b) (1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a) (1) (B), (e) (1), 
1144 (b) (1) (Supp. V 1975). 
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In Keller, the district court ruled that since the minimum vesting 
requirements of ERISA were not yet efl'ective, it "must iook to pre-
ERISA federal and state law with regard to private profit sharing 
and retirement plans .... " 31 Because Keller's claim to a vested 
interest arose independently of ERISA, a fortiori it arose under state 
law. Accordingly, the district court concluded that under Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins32 state law governed Keller's claim and held 
that an Ohio state court would apply a "reasonableness" test and 
uphold the forfeiture. 33 However, the Keller court failed to consider 
the effect of the ERISA preemption provision. 34 
In contrast, in Amory the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York squarely faced the gap issue. That court noted the 
absence of an express provision in ERISA dealing with bad boy 
forfeitures of vested rights declared during the interim period. Ac-
cording to the Amory court, these forfeitures are outlawed only as 
of the effective date of the minimum vesting standards. The court 
acknowledged that "plaintiff would have us fill this apparent void 
[the gap period] by pre-dating the prohibition of forfeitures, while 
defendants would have us rule that insofar as it concerns forfeitures, 
[ERISA] is wholly without effect until January of 1976."35 The 
court rejected both approaches, instead ruling that during the gap 
period the effect and operation of bad boy clauses must be governed 
by federal common law derived from ERISA.36 Thus, the Amory rule 
is that during the interim: 
declarations of forfeiture of vested pension rights must be subject 
to judicial scrutiny according to a reasonableness test. The stan-
dard of reasonableness, should, as a consequence of the public 
policy expressed in the Congressional mandate, be a rigorous one 
and should be applied both to forfeiture provisions and their appli-
cation .... Indeed, we believe that during this interim period 
ERISA creates a presumption of unreasonableness in forfeiture 
31. Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See notes 129 through 136 and accompanying text infra. 
33. Because no Ohio state court had actually ruled on the enforceability of a bad boy 
clause in a qualified plan, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
was forced to decide the issue as if it were an Ohio state court. In doing so the court adopted 
the "majority" state rule, which upholds the "validity of non competition forfeiture provisions 
in pension plans absent a statute to the contrary .... " 422 F. Supp. at 1013. 
34. While the court cited ERISA, § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (Supp. V 1975), it focused 
primarily on the effective date of the minimum vesting standards, ERISA, § 211, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1061 (Supp. V 1975). While properly noting that the ERISA vesting standards were not yet 
effective, the court concluded that since ERISA was not dispositive of the vesting and forfei-
ture issue, state law applied. 422 F. Supp. at 1008-09. 
35. Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
36. !d. 
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provisions and places the burden of proof on those who wish to 
apply them. 37 
According to the Amory court, this conclusion is strengthened by 
the fact that the effective date of ERISA's ban on forfeiture provi-
sions in pension plans was delayed until January 1, 1976,38 "not 
because of any Congressional hesitancy concerning the wisdom of 
the prohibition, but because employers needed more time to insure 
that their funds were adequately financed to comply with the stat-
ute's vesting requirements of which the anti-forfeiture section is a 
part. "39 
In contrast, the Keller opinion rejected the argument that the 
forfeiture was contrary to an emerging public policy opposing forfei-
tures of vested rights. While ERISA emphasizes nonforfeitable pen: 
sion benefits and replaces the prior considerations of reasonableness 
and business justification, "[i]t required comprehensive legislation 
. . . to make that new consideration preeminent and such legisla-
tion is prospective in operation . . . To invalidate past action on the 
basis of present and future policy would be manifestly unfair."40 
Interestingly, in the course of deciding the validity of bad boy 
forfeitures during the gap period, both the Amory and Keller courts 
assumed that after the effective date of the minimum vesting provi-
sions, a plan participant's vested rights to qualified plan benefits 
could not be forfeited by operation of a bad boy clause prohibiting 
competitive behavior. 
However, neither court considered temporary Treasury regula-
tions, recently finalized, which were already almost a year old at the 
time of the opinions. 41 These regulations permit bad boy forfeitures 
of rights vested in excess of the ERISA nonforfeitable minimum.42 
In addition, the pre-ERISA vesting schedule in Keller easily could 
be brought within the parameters of a regulation example that per-
37. /d. at 673. 
38. /d. More accurately, § 203 of ERISA does not become effective for plans in existence 
on January 1, 1974, until the first plan year beginning after December 31, 1975. ERISA, § 
211 (b) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1061 (b) (2) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 410 (historical note). 
39. Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
40. Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
41. See text accompanying notes 101 through 103 infra. Those regulations have been 
promulgated in final form and may be found at 42 Fed. Reg. 42,318 (Aug. 23, 1977). 
42. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (a) - 4 (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423 (Nov. 5, 1975) ("To the 
extent that rights are not required to be nonforfeitable to satisfy the minimum vesting stan-
dards, or the nondiscrimination requirements of§ 401 (a) (4), they may be forfeited .... "). 
The final regulations promulgated in 42 Fed. Reg. 42,326 (Aug. 23, 1977) contain identical 
language. 
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mits a forfeiture for cause. 43 Thus, under the Treasury Department's 
reasoning the ERISA minimum vesting requirements apparently 
permit a forfeiture on facts such as those in Keller. 44 The Amory 
court correctly held that during the interim period between the 
effective date of the ERISA preemption provision and the effective 
date of the minimum vesting standards, federal common law de-
rived from ERISA and its underlying public policy should govern 
bad boy clauses. However, that court erred by interpreting federal 
common law to require a reasonableness test of these clauses. An 
examination of the legislative history of ERISA's preemption and 
vesting provisions, and the public policy underlying them will show 
that federal common law should declare unenforceable all bad boy 
clauses during the gap period as well as after the effective date of 
the minimum vesting standards. Furthermore, the same public pol-
icy supports a voiding of bad boy forfeitures as to benefits vested in 
excess of the minimum standards. 
ERISA's NoNFORFEITABILITY PRovisiONs 
Background and History 
Before ERISA, over two-thirds of the privately maintained quali-
fied retirement plans provided vested rights to benefits prior to 
retirement. But, generally, under the larger plans employees did not 
acquire vested rights until they either were relatively mature or had 
43. !d. §§ 11.411 (a)-4 (c) (example 1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423-24. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (a)-4 
(c) (example 1), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,327 (Aug. 23, 1977). See notes 101 through 102 and accompa-
nying text infra. 
44. Under ERISA, a plan's vesting schedule is permitted to disregard years of service 
completed prior to the establishment of the plan. ERISA,§ 203 (b) (1) (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 
(b) (1) (c) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a) (4) (c). Therefore, the Keller plan's vesting 
schedule could be amended to provide 10% vesting for each year of service (disregarding years 
of service completed prior to March 1, 1969, the plan's original effective date), subject to 
divestiture for cause until completion of 10 years of such service. The plan would then meet 
the 10 year "notch" minimum nonforfeitability alternative of§ 411 (a) (2) (A) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and § 11. 411 (a)- 4 (c) (example 1) of the temporary and final Treasury 
regulations. Also, under Revenue Procedure 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550, a plan is deemed to meet 
the requirement of § 401 (a) ( 4) of the Internal Revenue Code, if its vesting schedule meets 
one of the ERISA minimum vesting, i.e., nonforfeitability, requirements and, "in the case of 
any plan which had previously been the subject of a favorable advance determination letter 
which has not been revoked, [if] the percentage of vesting of each participant provided under 
the plan, as amended, is not less (at every point) than that provided under the vesting 
schedule of the plan upon which such most recent prior determination letter was based .... " 
!d. § 3.01 (2). Under its then most recent determination letter, the Keller plan provided 10% 
vesting for each year of participation, subject to divestiture for cause. Thus, the Keller plan 
would have met the test in Revenue Procedure 76-11 quoted above if it had been amended to 
include a vesting schedule which recognized 10% for each year of service (disregarding years 
of service completed prior to the plan's original effective date), subject to divestiture for cause 
prior to completion of 10 years of service. See Lee, Credited Service After ERISA, 31 TAX. L. 
REv. 365, 465 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Credited Service). 
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completed a long period of participation. 45 Specifically, only one-
third of the private plan participants had a fifty percent vested right 
to accrued retirement benefits. Moreover, fifty-eight percent of the 
plan participants between the ages of fifty and sixty, and fifty-four 
percent of those age sixty and over were not even fifty percent 
vested. 46 Consequently, even employees with substantial periods of 
service could lose their retirement benefits upon separation from 
service. In extreme cases, aged participants lost their entire retire-
ment benefits due to their discharge shortly before reaching retire-
ment age.H 
Representative Dent believed that vesting constituted the worst 
situation encountered in the congressional examination of the entire 
private pension system. 48 Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Finance, also pointed out: 
Now, what kind of equity is there in a situation where you have a 
company, which because of normal turnover of personnel, has an 
employee who stayed with the company for 30 years and then left, 
and the company picks up the pension that he left. Not only that 
pension but the pension that perhaps 50 other people earned. What 
kind of justice is that?49 
Long's and Dent's premise, accepted by commentators, 50 was that 
employer contributions constitute deferred wages earned by the par-
45. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 14; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 12. 
46. ld. 
47. Plan rules governing service-related eligibility requirements, such as a requirement 
that 20 years of service be completed, uninterrupted by a "break-in-service" (a 12 month 
period during which a participant is credited with less than 500 hours of service, see, e.g., 
ERISA,§ 2-3 (b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975)) have generated considera-
ble litigation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1976); Foley v. Devaney, 
528 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1976); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of Ilium. Prods. Indus., 529 
F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1976); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1975); Giler v. Board of 
Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers Pension Plan, 509 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975); Pete v. U.M.W. 
Welfare and Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
48. Hearings on H. R. 2 and H. R. 462 before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House 
Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 
2 Hearings) ("The real problem is the vesting where men have worked for 40 and more years 
for different employers and they never vested anywhere."). 
49. Hearings on S. 4, S. 1179, and S. 1631 Before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans 
of the Serwte Comm. on Firwnce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess 1, 340 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Senate Finance Hearings); see 120 CoNG. REc. 4287 (1974), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 21, at 3395 ("It is immoral to require a worker to forfeit 25 years of pension 
contributions and benefits if he exercises his God-given right to take another job ... ") 
(statement of Rep. Biaggi). 
50. Note, Pen.5ion Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 909, 
917 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rights of the Retired Worker]; Note, Forfeiture of Pension 
Benefits for Violation of Coverwnts Not to Compete, 61 Nw. L. REv. 290, 292-94 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Forfeiture of Benefits]. See, e.g., Boyer v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, 
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ticipants and not merely employer gratuities. The ERISA commit-
tee reports indicate that both houses of Congress agreed forfeitures 
of pension benefits upon separation from service were inequitable, 
apart from the resulting hardships, "since the pension contributions 
previously made on behalf of the employee may have been in lieu 
of additional compensation or some other benefit which he would 
have received."51 Furthermore, factors such as the mobile nature of 
the American economy wherein employees tend to change jobs fre-
quently, and the cyclical nature of certain industries plagued by 
frequent layoffs added to the tax committees' belief in the necessity 
for vesting standards that insure covered employees will actually 
benefit from retirement plans.52 Insofar as Congress thought that 
more rapid vesting would improve the mobility of labor and thereby 
promote a more healthy economy, 53 eliminations of bad boy clauses 
would be consonant with that goal. 
Representative Dent believed that ideally an employee should be 
fully vested after only a trial period of service.54 But Congress was 
aware that under our voluntary pension system, the cost of financ-
ing pension plans is an important factor in determining whether 
any particular retirement plan will be adopted, and that unduly 
large increases in costs could impede the growth and improvement 
of the private retirement system. For this reason, in the case of 
those requirements which add to the cost of financing retirement 
plans, the committee has sought to adopt provisions which strike 
a balance between providing meaningful reform and keeping costs 
within reasonable limits.55 
In other words, Congress recognized that a requirement of imme-
diate and full vesting was not feasible since additional costs would 
inhibit employer willingness to adopt new plans and to liberalize 
existing plans.56 Ultimately, the House committees, faced with the 
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 471, 473 (D.S.Dak. 1975); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797-98 (1972); Van Hosen v. Bankers Trust Co., 
200 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1972). 
51. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 45; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 53. 
52. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 18; S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 19. 
53. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 45. For a thoughtful analysis of the effects of 
vesting on employee mobility see Norman, Private Pensions: A Study of Vesting, Funding, 
and Integration, 21 FLA. L. REv. 141, 156-59 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Norman]; see also 
Koehn & Ptacek, Employer Protection Against Loss of the Key Employee, 57 IowA L. REv. 
75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Koehn & Ptacek]. 
54. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 285, 499; see also S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 
19, at 19; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19. 
55. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 18. 
56. ld. at 15-19; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19; H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 
48, at 235, 330, 411, 509; Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 346-51, 354. 
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necessity of providing adequate flexibility for minimum vesting 
standards for thousands of retirement plans, concluded that it was 
not desirable to force all retirement plans into one rigid vesting 
schedule .57 
The Nixon administration, at the ERISA hearings, articulated 
other, perhaps ideological considerations such as the role of govern-
ment intervention in pension planning. The administration advo-
cated the view that unions and employers in collective bargaining 
already had negotiated trade-off's between vesting rights and benefit 
levels. 58 A related criticism was voiced by Representative Erlenborn, 
the ranking minority member of the General Subcommittee on 
Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor. He felt 
that organized labor had negotiated for and received high benefit 
levels, primarily because of the large numbers of forfeitures result-
ing from the permissible slow vesting. Having achieved high levels 
of benefits, labor now was unfairly "coming to Congress to impose 
on plans additional costs for vesting that ... [labor] had not 
negotiated for. " 59 
57. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19; 120 CoNG. REc. 4287, 4292 (1974) (remarks 
of Reps. Biaggi and Ullman, respectively), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
21, at 3395, 3407. 
58. As then Secretary of Treasury Shultz stated during the 1973 hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Finance: 
People have to make a judgment about the nature of the plan they want to agree 
to. I think to a degree we have to say in the government that if the unions and 
management want to make an agreement of some kind and it is satisfactory to them 
and it is full and open and above board, then we should think twice about putting 
ourselves above their judgment in this tradeoff that they have. 
Now, in imposing a rule of vesting of some kind-and I have no doubt this is the 
reason why Congress has not done it up to this point-you are imposing a govern-
mental judgment on these private plans. And we think that it is appropriate to do 
that but not to go so far as to basically destroy the cost basis of the gigantic private 
pension plans we have. 
Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 341; see also H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 
72-73, 388-89 (remarks of Reps. Burton and Erlenborn, respectively). 
59. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 421. The same type of thought process is reflected 
in a recent Eighth Circuit case which held that federal labor law preempted the Minnesota 
Pension Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 181 B.01-17 (1976). White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599 
(8th Cir. 1976). The state statute required the employer to fund fully his plan's past service 
liability, i.e., liability attributable to service completed prior to the plan's establishment, 
upon termination of the plan or cessation of operations at a place of employment. MINN. STAT. 
§ 181 B.03 (1976). Prior to the enactment of ERISA, past service liability was amortized over 
a 40 year period, if credit was given at all for service prior to the plan's establishment. Thus, 
the statute was preempted, since it directly intruded upon the employer's substantive obliga-
tions under a plan which resulted from negotiations conducted pursuant to the National 
Labor Relations Act, as follows: 
(1) the [state) Act grants employees vested rights to pension benefits which are 
not available under the pension plan; (2) to the extent of any deficiency in the 
pension fund, the [state) Act requires satisfaction of pension benefits from the 
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The administration's negotiation analysis was, in turn, criticized 
by Ralph Nader who alleged that the union negotiators had failed 
to adequately represent employee participants due to conflicts of 
interest.60 The conflicts of interest were not, however, between union 
officials and the employees they represented. In many cases, partic-
ularly in the low-wage industries, the primary conflict centered on 
the relative priority to be accorded the competing interests of young 
workers with up to thirty-five years remaining until retirement, and 
old workers nearing retirement age.61 In effect, the thrust of the 
pension reform movement concerning vesting schedules favored 
congressionally enacted minimum standards which organized labor 
perhaps, simply could not achieve through collective bargaining. 
Yet, Congress was well aware of the thin line distinguishing viable 
minimum standards from those which would impose costs resulting 
general assets of the employer, while the pension plan provides that benefits shall 
be paid only out of the pension fund; and (3) the [state] Act does not permit 
employers to escape liability for funding of pension rights, but the pension plan 
permits White Motor to terminate the plan at any time, and in so doing end any 
liability for future payments to the pension fund, save those specifically guaran-
teed. 
545 F.2d at 603. Contra, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Glazer, 144 N.J. Super. 152, 365 A.2d 
1, 23 (Sup. Ct. Ch. 1976) (upholding a New Jersey statute similar to the Minnesota statute 
stricken by the Eighth Circuit in White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1976), 
based upon the reasoning of the subsequently reversed district court opinion in Malone, 412 
F. Supp. 372 (D. Minn. 1976)). 
60. Ralph Nader, as well as other commentators, maintained that the traditional 
"bargaining through representatives" approach broke down in the area of retirement benefits 
due to certain conflicts of interest: (1) union officials, because of their long service, are among 
the chief beneficiaries of the present pension planning system; and (2) bargaining for slight, 
but illusory, benefits wins more re-elections for unions and union leaders than securing the 
ability to threahn dissident bargaining unit employees with the argument that a change in 
bargaining representatives might result in the loss to employees of their pensions. H.R. 2 
Hearings, supra note 48, at 35, 251, 421-22. Representative Dent took a more balanced view: 
Up to now we have had some adherence to the so-called enterprise system and the 
unions' right to negotiate. Some of us think it is still a pretty good thing to do. 
However, when we find situations are getting out of hand, we move in, but we don't 
want the reform to kill what we are trying to reform. 
H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 283. Similarly, Senator Long thought that if collective 
bargaining under ERISA resulted, for example, in the receipt of benefits by only 50% of the 
employees who worked for an employer who maintained a plan, "we have written a very poor 
law. We have fixed it up so that the business agent took care of the business agent, so that 
... [the employer] took care of ... [the employer], but half of those working people 
suffered very badly." Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 49, at 341. 
61. See H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 328, 336-37 (remarks of Jacob Sheinkman, 
General Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing Workers). It should be noted that such 
tensions, however, are basically inconsistent with the position that retirement benefits consti-
tute a deferred payment of wages earned by the participant. See Halperin, Retirement Secu-
rity and Tax Equity: An Evaluation of ERISA, 17 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 739, 746, 748 
(1976); notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text supra. 
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in either reduced benefits or plan terminations. 62 Thus, two compet-
ing interests had to be balanced: the desire to encourage creation 
of private plans that would provide retirement benefits for the fifty 
percent of the labor force63 without such coverage against the desire 
to establish meaningful vesting standards. 
Closely allied to the question of cost was the issue whether to 
require retroactive vesting for service completed and benefits ac-
crued prior to enactment of ERISA. The Nixon administration 
noted the cost of such retroactivity would be very high-an assump-
tion disputed by some legislators. 64 Furthermore, former Secretary 
of the Treasury Shultz contended that retroactive vesting would 
"second-guess all of the decisions" between union and management 
as to what purchases ought to be made with the pension dol-
lar-greater benefits versus faster vesting. 65 Accordingly, witnesses 
at the congressional hearings on ERISA suggested various compro-
mises regarding retroactivity. 66 Witnesses also contended that the 
contemplated statutory vesting rules should vary with the type of 
employer maintaining the plan, the type of plan involved, the de-
gree of mobility inherently required of employees in particular occu-
pations, and the voluntary or involuntary nature of an employee's 
terminationY On the other hand, many management representa-
62. SeeS. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 18; H. R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 
19. Note that 'plan amendments which have the effect of reducing benefits already accrued 
by participants are subject to substantial limitations. Section 411 (d) (6) of the Internal 
Revenue Code provides: "A plan shall be treated as not satisfying the requirements of this 
section if the accrued benefit of a participant is decreased by an amendment of the plan, other 
than an amendment described in § 412 (c) (8)." Section 412 (c) (8) allows certain retroactive 
plan amendments, subject to strict timeliness, procedural, and substantive limitations. 
63. S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 13. 
64. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973)[hereinafter cited as S. REP. 
No. 93-127]. 
65. Sennte Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 345. 
66. The suggested compromises included: (1) counting prior service in determining the 
percentage vested only as to benefits accruing in the future, Sennte Finance Hearings, supra 
note 49, at 951-52 (pt.2); (2) treating the additional costs attributable to such vesting as a 
"past service" cost, which could be funded over a fairly long period, /d. at 1044; and (3) 
limiting retroactive vesting credit to employees who have attained at least age 45 by ERISA's 
effective date, as proposed by Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, seeS. REP. 
No. 92-1150, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1972) (proposal of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare). In 1973, however, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
abandoned the age 45 limitation on retroactive vesting because it tended to be arbitrary. 
Furthermore, eliminating the age-based cut-off would result in only marginal cost in-
creases-roughly 9% of the current plan cost or 2% of the overall payroll cost. S. REP. No. 
93-127, supra note 64, at 20. Some representatives of organized labor even asserted that no 
pension reform legislation would be acceptable if it did not require retroactivity for both 
benefit accrual rates and vesting schedules. Sennte Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 248, 
380. Witnesses at the hearings argued, sometimes submitting supporting briefs, that legisla-
tion requiring retroactive vesting would not be unconstitutional. /d. at 723-42, 839, 1008. 
67. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 64, at 18-19. 
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tives advocated alternative vesting schedules to accomodate such 
factors as the myriad vesting schedules in effect and the varying 
compositions of different industries' work forces. 68 Generally, they 
suggested any schedule be permitted so long as it was as liberal as 
the statutory standard.69 In order to effect that scheme, the depart-
ment with jurisdiction over minimum vesting could be authorized 
to grant variances on the basis of comparability.70 The various fac-
tors measuring comparability were proposed.71 It was also suggested 
that Congress permit existing plans to qualify by adopting one of 
three schedules contained in the various bills, 72 while requiring 
plans established in the future to adopt a single statutorily man-
dated vesting standard. 73 
The Statute-Proposals and Compromises 
The bill passed by the Senate required new plans to adopt a 
graduated five-to-fifteen year vesting schedule.74 Plans in existence 
on the date of the bill's enactment could retain a ten year "cliff" 
vesting schedule75 if the plan contained such a schedule on and after 
that date.76 The House bill not only offered both of those rules as 
alternatives, but in addition, permitted the age-weighted "rule of 
forty-five" discussed below.77 
The different vesting standards for existing and new plans con-
tained in the Senate bill would have achieved the House goal of 
providing "adequate flexibility" to the hundreds of thousands of 
68. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 275. 
69. /d. at 275, 392, 858. 
70. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 48, at 165, 384, 386-87. 
71. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 838-39, 924-25; H.R. 2 Hearings, supra 
note 48, at 387. 
72. S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202, 119 CoNG. REC. 93 (1973) (30% vested after 8 years of 
covered service and 10% per year additional vesting thereafter) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 117-21; S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 322, 119 CoNG. REc. 7415 
(1973) (25% after 5 years of plan participation and 5% per year thereafter), reprinted in I 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 235-39; S. 1631, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (a), 119 CoNG. 
REc. 12926 (1973) (rule of 50-50% vesting when sum of age and years of participation equals 
50 (or upon completion of 3 continuous years of service, if later) and 10% per year thereafter), 
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 328-29. 
73. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 845, 951. This was similar to the original 
approach taken in H.R. 2 as introduced. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203, 119 CoNG. REC. 
37 (1973) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 53-56. 
74. For an explanation of the "5 to 15 year graduated vesting schedule" see text accom-
panying notes 86-87 infra. 
75. For an explanation of the "10 year cliff'' vesting schedule see text accompanying notes 
80-85 infra. 
76. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 221, 119 CONG. REc. 30428 (1973) as passed the 
Senate, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1901-03. 
77. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 54. 
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existing retirement plans. However, in ERISA Congress adopted the 
House approach requiring all employee pension benefit plans to 
meet one of three minimum vesting schedules for accrued benefits 
deriv_ed from employer contributions.78 These three options must be 
applied to all of a participant's years of service; composite arrange-
ments employing one rule for certain years of service and another 
rule for other years are prohibited/9 
Under the first option, "ten year full" vesting, 80 an employee with 
at least ten years of service must have a 100% nonforfeitable right 
to his "accrued benefit derived from employer contributions"; 81 
however, the plan may defer all vesting during the first nine years 
of service.82 The "full vesting" option affords participants total vest-
ing protection after the completion of a reasonably short period of 
serviceY However, this cliff vesting has been criticized because it 
gives an employer a great incentive to peremptorily dismiss employ-
ees rather than absorb the sharp increase in plan costs that occurs 
when the employees' rights to accrued benefits become 100% vested 
upon completion of the tenth year of service.84 Congress undoubt-
edly permitted plans to continue cliff vesting schedules because of 
their inherent simplicity: the extensive record-keeping and conse-
quential high administrative costs which may be involved in ac-
counting for partially vested rights are avoided under this ap-
proach.85 
A second vesting option is the "five-to-fifteen year graduated" 
schedule under which a participant must have a twenty-five percent 
nonforfeitable interest in his accrued benefits attributable to em-
78. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a) (2). 
79. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.411 (a)· 3 (a) (3), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,422 (Nov. 5, 1975). 
80. Under the "cliff" or "full vesting" alternative, a participant has no vested right to any 
of his employer-derived accrued benefits until he satisfies certain service related require-
ments. When those requirements are met, the participant's rights to the accrued benefits 
previously credited to him become fully vested. Thereafter, the participant has an immediate 
and fully vested right to any accrued benefits subsequently derived from employer contribu-
tions. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 131 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as 
McGILL]. 
81. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 
(a) (2) (A). 
82. See note 80 supra. 
83. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 20, 55. For example, once an employee serves 
10 years he has greater vesting protection under the 10 year full vesting approach than under 
a 5 to 15 graduated vesting schedule. This is because under a graduated vesting schedule, a 
specified percentage of a participant's accrued benefits vests only as specified units of service 
are completed. McGILL, supra note 80, at 132. Thus, under the latter system a participant 
may not become fully vested until the beginning of his 16th year of service. 
84. Speech by John Hall, Association for Advanced Life Underwriting, at 12 (May 10, 
1974); S. REP. No. 93-383, supra note 19, at 46. 
85. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 55. 
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ployer contributions after five years of service.86 For the next five 
years of service his accrued benefit must vest at the rate of an 
additional five percent per year so that the participant's interest is 
fifty percent vested after ten years. During the last five years of 
service, the accrued benefits must become nonforfeitable at the rate 
of an additional ten percent per year, resulting in complete nonfor-
feitability after fifteen years of service. This option permits gradual 
vesting on an age-neutral basis, unlike the "rule of forty-five" vest-
ing option discussed below. The advantages of the graduated vest-
ing approach lie in its recognition of some vesting at a relatively 
early point in time and the minimization of cost which results from 
its gradual natureY 
The third alternative is the age-weighted "rule of forty-five," 88 a 
variant of the controversial "rule of fifty" advocated by the Nixon 
administration.89 Under this option, a participant must have a non-
forfeitable right to at least fifty percent of his accrued benefits at-
tributable to employer contributions when, after five years of serv-
ice, the sum of his age and years of service equals forty-five. There-
after, his nonforfeitable rights must approach full vesting at the rate 
of ten percentage points for each of the following five years. This 
option was designed for firms that wish to provide faster vesting for 
their more mature employees than for their younger employees.90 
The Senate conferees91 added to the House bill's rule of forty-five 
alternative92 the requirement that plans grant an employee who 
completes ten years of service a nonforfeitable interest in at least 
fifty percent of his accrued benefit at that time, with an additional 
ten percent vesting for each additional year of service thereafter.93 
Nevertheless, there was concern that even the modified rule of forty-
five might lead to hiring discrimination against older workers, and 
86. ERISA, § 203 (a) (2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 (a) 
(2) (B). 
87. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 55. See Hearings on General Tax Reform, 
Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 7) 
(1973). 
88. ERISA, § 203 (a)(2)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1975); I.R.C. § 411 
(a)(2)(C). 
89. See S. 1631, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (a) (2), 119 CoNG. REc. 12926 (1973); Senate 
Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 336 (remarks of Secretary of the Treasury Schultz). 
90. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 19, 55. 
91. Because the House and Senate bills were substantially different, conferees from the 
tax and labor committees of the House and the Senate met for 20 days in executive session 
to reconcile the inconsistencies. III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4276. 
92. See text accompanying note 88 supra. 
93. 120 CONG. REc. 29940 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4764-65. 
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ten year cliff vesting might prevent participants with an average 
length of service from obtaining vested benefits.94 Consequently, 
ERISA section 3022 (a)(l) 95 specifically directs the Joint Pension 
Task Force96 to gather evidence on the operation of these vesting 
rules in order to determine whether they adequately fulfill the needs 
of the nation's work force. 
The Senate conferees also succeeded97 in eliminating the House 
bill's provisions that would have: (1) phased-in the vesting require-
ment;98 (2) permitted plans to retroactively decrease vested bene-
fits without the consent of the Secretary of Labor;99 and (3) permit-
ted, in certain cases, indefinite delays in achieving compliance with 
the vesting requirements. 100 
The Treasury Regulations 
While Title II of ERISA, the tax provisions, defines the term 
"nonforfeitable" only negatively by listing certain permitted forfei-
tures, 101 both the temporary and final Treasury regulations provide 
that: 
94. !d. 
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1222 (a) (1) (Supp. V 1975). 
96. The duties assigned under Title Ill of ERISA to the Joint Pension Task Force are to 
be carried out by "(t]he staffs of the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee 
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, the Joint Committee on Internal 
Revenue Taxation, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare of the Senate ... "ERISA, § 3021, 29 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975). 
97. 120 CONG. REc. 29940 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4765. 
98. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203 (a) (2) (D) (as passed by the House) (1974), re-
printed in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 3975. The House conferees conceded 
this point for the reason that costs to the employer which would result from financing the 
minimum vesting standards were expected to be relatively moderate. 120 CoNG. REC. 29199 
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Ullman), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4675. 
99. !d. §§ 203 (0 (1), 501, reprinted in III LEGISLATrvE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 3978, 
4041. 
100. !d. § 501, reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4041. 
101. I.R.C. § 411 (a) (3); see also ERISA, § 203 (a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (3) (Supp. V 
1975). For instance, an otherwise nonforfeitable accrued benefit may be forfeited in the event 
that a participant dies prior to reaching the plan's normal or early retirement age. I.R.C. § 
411 (a) (3) (A); see also ERISA,§ 203 (a) (3) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (3) (A) (Supp. V 1975). 
This exception to the general rule ofnonforfeitability is, in turn, subject to an exception where 
a survivor annuity is payable as provided in I.R.C. § 401 (a) (11). Note that, historically, while 
defined contribution plans have not provided for this type of forfeiture, defined benefit plans 
usually have done so. See Lee, Joint and Survivor Annuities under ERISA-The Gamble on 
Survival, 3 J. CoRP. TAX. 241, 242, 244 (1976). Section 3 (19) of ERISA provides, for Title I 
purposes only, that "[t]he term 'nonforfeitable' when used with respect to a pension benefit 
or right means a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immedi-
ate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant's service, which 
is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (19) 
(Supp. V 1975). 
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a right to an accrued benefit is considered to be nonforfeitable at 
a particular time if, at that time and thereafter, it is an uncondi-
tional right [with the exception of the statutorily permitted forfei-
tures] ... [A] right which, at a particular time, is conditioned 
upon a subsequent event, subsequent performance, or subsequent 
forbearance, is a forfeitable right at that time. 102 
155 
In this regard, the legislative history specifically indicates that the 
minimum nonforfeitable rights to accrued benefits can not be for-
feited because of a participant's disloyalty to the employer.l03 How-
ever, the above-quoted Treasury regulation continues: "to the ex-
tent that rights are not required to be nonforfeitable to satisfy the 
minimum vesting standards, or the nondiscrimination standards of 
§401 (a)(4), they may be forfeited without regard to the limitation 
on forfeitability required by this section."104 The regulations offer 
the following example of the bad boy forfeitures permitted by that 
clause. 
Corporation A's plan provided that an employee is fully vested in 
his employer-derived accrued benefit after completion of 5 years 
of service. The plan also provided that, if an employee works for a 
competitor he forfeits his rights in the plan. Such provision could 
result in the forfeiture of an employee's rights which are required 
to be nonforfeitable under section 411 and therefore the plan would 
not satisfy the requirements of section 411. If the plan limited the 
forfeiture to employees who completed less than 10 years of service, 
the plan would not fail to satisfy the requirements of section 411 
because the forfeitures under this provision are limited to rights 
which are in excess of the minimum required to be nonforfeitable 
under section 411 (a)(2)(A).'05 
102. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ ll.4ll (a)- 4 (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423 (Nov. 5, 1975). Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.411 (a)-4 (a), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,326 (Aug. 23, 1977). 
103. See notes 19·20 and accompanying text supra. 
104. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 11.411 (a)- 4 (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,423 (Nov. 5, 1975). Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.411 (a)- 4 (a), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,326 (Aug. 23, 1977), after the language quoted in the text 
adds: 
Rights which are required to be prospectively nonforfeitable under the vesting 
standards are nonforfeitable and may not be forfeited until it is determined that 
such rights are, in fact, in excess of the vesting standards. Thus, employees have a 
right to vest in the accrued benefits if they continue in employment of employers 
maintaining the plan unless a forfeitable event recognized by section 4ll occurs. 
For example, if a plan covered employees in Division A of Corporation X under a 
plan utilizing a 10-year-100 percent vesting schedule, the plan could not forfeit 
employees' rights on account of their moving to service in Division B of Corporation 
X prior to completion of 10 years of service even though employees are not vested 
at that time. 
105. /d. § 11.411 (a)-4 (c) (example 1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51,424 (Nov. 5, 1975). Treas. Reg. § 
1. 411 (a)-4 (c) (example 1), 42 Fed. Reg. 42,327 (Aug. 23, 1977). 
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The Treasury drafters' rationale was that, where an employee 
pension benefit plan grants a more liberal rate of vesting than re-
quired under ERISA, then such extra vesting may revert to one of 
the statutory minimums, e.g., no vesting until ten years of service 
have been completed, if the participant in question should violate 
the plan's bad boy clause. 106 Clearly, the same reasoning would 
apply to the validity of bad boy clauses during the interim period 
between the effective date of the preemption section and the vesting 
provisions. 
In a National Office Technical Advice Memorandum, 107 the Inter-
nal Revenue Service recently considered a plan which provided ten 
year graduated vesting, a more liberal schedule than required by 
ERISA. Under the plan, a participant who had completed less than 
ten years of service would forfeit his otherwise vested benefits if he 
violated the bad boy clause. The Service's district office took the 
position that the plan would not qualify unless it was shown, using 
the ten year cliff alternative, that the plan would be able to meet 
the nondiscrimination requirements of section 401 (a)( 4). 108 The tax-
payer argued that the bad boy clause was not inherently discrimina-
tory. 
The National Office pointed out that the example in the tempo-
rary regulations was based on the rule that rights may not be for-
feited which are required to be nonforfeitable in order to satisfy the 
minimum vesting standard or the nondiscrimination requirements. 
Consequently, the Office concluded that the taxpayer must demon-
strate the plan would satisfy the nondiscrimination requirements of 
section 401 (a)(4), using the ten year cliff vesting alternative in order 
to qualify under section 401(a). However, the memorandum does 
not indicate whether the requisite demonstration could be satisfied 
by proving that the forfeitures resulting solely from application of 
the bad boy clause would not be twice as high109 among the rank-
and-file employees as among employees in the prohibited group. A 
106. Credited Service, supra note 44, at 465. 
107. A copy of the Memorandum is on file with the author. 
108. I.R.C. § 40l(a)(4). 
109. Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584, provides in part, if the turnover rate among the 
rank-and-file employees is more than twice the turnover rate among the prohibited group, 
then more rapid vesting than the statutory minimum will be required, i.e., 40% after 4 years 
of employment, 45% after 5 years, 50% after 6 and 10% per year thereafter-the "four-forty" 
vesting schedule. However, until the company has achieved 5 years of work experience more 
liberal turnover rules apply. This approach to turnover suggests that in applying a discrimi-
nation test to a bad boy clause, it might be appropriate to compare the rates of forfeitures 
among the rank-and-file and prohibited groups that result solely from application of the 
plan's bad boy clause, and not those that result merely from the aU-or-nothing nature of the 
10 year cliff vesting approach. 
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more burdensome alternative would require a showing that forfei-
tures would be within those limits even after application of both the 
plan's ten year vesting schedule and its bad boy clause. Moreover, 
because of the given facts the memorandum does not address the 
question whether the plan sponsor of a pre-ERISA plan could show 
that a post-ERISA graduated vesting schedule, subject to a bad boy 
clause, would satisfy the nondiscrimination requirements of section 
401 (a), where the pre-ERISA vesting schedule was the same and 
the pre-ERISA plan contained a bad boy clause. 110 
The drafters of the regulations did not address and probably did 
not consider the threshold question whether bad boy provisions 
would be enforceable at all under federal common law after the 
effective date of the ERISA preemption provisions. The search for 
an answer to that question entails an examination of the preemption 
doctrine and, in particular, the scope of ERISA's preemption provi-
siOns. 
ERISA's PREEMPTION PRoviSIONS 
The preemption doctrine has been described 111 as the means for 
determining how regulatory authority has been allocated between 
the states and the federal government under the supremacy clause 
of the Constitution. 112 Generally, two tests are applied by the judici-
ary to determine whether state law has been preempted: whether 
state regulation would "conflict" with the federal regulation in 
question, and whether Congress intended to "occupy" the area in 
question to the exclusion of the states. 113 As regards the conflict test, 
the cases finding that state law has been preempted 
110. In the wake of criticism of the position taken by the Service in Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-
2 C.B. 584, (see Credited Service, supra note 44, at 382-83), the Service retreated. Rev. Proc. 
76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550, in effect, created a grandfather clause for pre-ERISA plans. A safe 
harbor is granted: 
in the case of any plan which had previously been the subject of a favorable advance 
determination letter which has not been revoked, [so long as] the percentage of 
vesting of each participant provided under the plan, as amended, is not less (at 
every point) than that provided under the vesting schedule of the plan upon which 
such most recent prior determination Jetter was based. . . . 
Arguably, a plan would meet this test, even though employing a 10 years of service graduated 
vesting schedule that was subject to forfeiture for bad boy activities engaged in before comple-
tion of 10 years of service, where the prior plan had a 10 years of participation graduated 
vesting schedule, with a similar bad boy clause. The author has successfully employed this 
argument in obtaining a favorable advance determination letter. 
111. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism 
and the Burger Court, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preemption 
Doctrine]. 
112. U.S. CaNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
113. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946). See generally Preemption 
Doctrine, supra note 111, at 624-39. 
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tend to fall into one of two categories: (1) those that reflect the 
concern that "one forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct which 
the other forum would. find legal" and those that reflect the con-
cern "that the [application of state law by] state courts would 
restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Federal Acts." 114 
The occupation test, in turn, focuses upon whether Congress in-
tended to foreclose state regulation in a particular field. 115 Where 
Congress is silent, the courts have found preemption where a clear 
implication of congressional intent to occupy the field can be 
shown. 116 However, Congress may also state such an intent di-
rectly, 117 as it did in section 514 of ERISA, which took effect on 
January 1, 1976. 118 
Section 514 (a) provides that Title I of ERISA, 119 the labor title, 
and Title IV, 120 the termination insurance provisions, shall "super-
sede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan .... " 121 Section 514 (c)(1), in 
turn, defines the term "state law" to include "all laws, decisions, 
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of 
any State." 122 It is beyond question that Congress intended by this 
provision to make federal law the sole authority regulating the field 
of employee benefit plans. 123 The scope of federal regulation clearly 
includes areas such as reporting and disclosure requirements12~ and 
fiduciary obligations, 125 generally effective January 1, 1975. 126 It also 
encompasses the application of ERISA's nonforfeitability provi-
sions, 127 to plans in existence on January 1, 1974, for plan years 
beginning after December 31, 1975.128 A more difficult question is 
whether state law, under the Erie doctrine, 129 or whether federal 
114. Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel'ns Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 138 (1976). See Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
115. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963). 
116. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 157 (1942). For a discussion of the 
factors used to determine the implied congressional intent see note 145 infra. 
117. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act,§ 6 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 755 (b) (Supp. 
v 1975). 
118. ERISA, § 514 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (Supp. V 1975). 
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (Supp. V 1975). 
120. Id. §§ 1301-1381. 
121. Id. § 1144 (a). The full text of§ 514 is set out in note 10 supra. 
122. Id. § 1144 (c) (1). 
123. 120 CoNG. REc. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4670-71. 
124. ERISA, tit. I, part 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021·31. 
125. ld. tit. I, part 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14. 
126. Id. §§ 111 (b) (1), 414 (a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1031 (b) (1), 1114 (a). 
127. ld. tit. I, part 2, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61. 
128. ld. § 211 (b) (2), 29 u.s.c. § 1061 (b) (2). 
129. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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common law130 applies to bad boy clauses during the gap period 
between the respective effective dates of ERISA's preemption and 
nonforfeitability provisions, Clearly, where federal statutes deter-
mine rights and liabilities, federal common law rather than state 
law applies. 131 The Erie doctrine "is inapplicable to those areas of 
judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated 
by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they effect 
must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those 
statutes, rather than by locallaw." 132 
The ERISA Conference Report stated that all actions to enforce 
benefit rights or to recover benefits under a plan "are to be regarded 
as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to 
those actions brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act of 1947," 133 which the Supreme Court has held are 
subject to a federal common law. 134 The development of federal 
common law under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act of 1947135 indicates that courts are required to examine the pol-
icy of the federal legislation. They may also refer to state law if it is 
compatible with the federal policy. 136 Senator Javits, in the floor 
debate on the conference bill, stated that it was intended "that a 
body of Federal substantive law be developed by the courts to deal 
with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare 
and pension plans." 137 
Another convincing indication that federal substantive law 
should be used to interpret and enforce employee benefit plan terms 
is the development of the preemption provision in the various House 
130. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra. 
131. Thurber v. Western Conf. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 542 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
132. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); accord, Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943). 
133. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974). 
134. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). 
135. Section 301 (a) provides: 
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court 
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1970). 
136. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). Lincoln Mills held that a 
federal common law should be fashioned under§ 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act of 1947. 
137. 120 CONG. REc. 29942 (1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 
4771. 
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and Senate bills. House Resolution 2, the bill passed by the House, 
provided that, except for actions brought by a participant or bene-
ficiary to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan or 
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan, 
the labor provisions of H.R. 2 preempted state laws "insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to the reporting and disclosure 
responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any employee benefit 
plan to which part 1 applies." 138 A separate subsection preempted 
state laws that related to nonforfeitability of participants' benefits, 
funding requirements, adequacy of financing, portability require-
ments, or insurance of pension benefits. 139 
The Nixon administration's bill 140 was structured similarly, al-
though it more explicitly left to state law the interpretation of the 
plan document insofar as it related to the amount of benefits due a 
particular participant. At the Senate Finance Committee Hearings, 
a Department of Labor representative interpreted this bill to mean 
that state law would apply to actions brought by participants and 
beneficiaries to recover benefits due under the plan or to clarify 
rights to future benefits. 141 
In contrast, the bill passed by the Senate142 preempted any and 
all state laws relating to matters regulated by ERISA. Section 699 
(b) of that bill permitted state court jurisdiction in any action by a 
fiduciary seeking an interpretation of the plan documents. However, 
in such actions, state laws would be superseded to the extent they 
related "to the fiduciary, reporting and disclosure responsibilities of 
persons acting for or on behalf of employee benefit plans . . . except 
insofar as they may relate the amount of benefits due beneficiaries 
under the terms of the plan. " 143 Because the exceptions and restric-
tions contained in the prior bills were discarded, the absolute lan-
guage of ERISA section 514 would, under traditional statutory con-
struction, apply to suits for benefits requiring interpretation of plan 
terms. 144 From this history, it appears that the scope of ERISA's 
138. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 514 (a) (as passed by the House) 119 CoNG. R.Ec. 4782 
(1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4057. 
139. /d. § 514 (c), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4058-59. 
140. S. 1557, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14, 119 CoNG. REc. 12061, 12075 (1973) reprinted in I 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 319-21. 
141. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 49, at 449 (written statement of the Department 
of Labor, presented by Paul J. Fasser, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management). 
142. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699, 119 CONG. REc. 30428 (as passed by the Senate) 
(1973), reprinted in ll LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 2103-05. 
143. /d. § 599 (b) (emphasis added). 
144. Nat'! Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 706 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1974) (finding that 
a conference committee's deletion of an expansive phrase in § 2 (a) of the House version of 
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preemption includes state law interpretation of employee benefit 
plan provisions. Thus, federal common law interpreting such provi-
sions must develop. 145 
Congress could have drafted the ERISA preemption provision to 
apply piecemeal as the various substantive areas became effective, 
but it did not do so. Consequently, the clear language and the legis-
lative intent of the preemption provision, urider establishedprece-
dent concerning federal common law, strongly support the Amory 
court's holding that during the interim period the effect and opera-
tion of bad boy clauses may not be judged by pre-existing state law, 
but must be governed by a federal common law to be derived from 
ERISA. However, the determination of whether Amory correctly 
derived such federal law requires an examination of the general pre-
ERISA state law regarding bad boy clauses, the policies underlying 
ERISA, and the interplay between those two concerns. 
PRE-ERISA STATE BAn BoY AuTHORITY 
Discharge for Cause 
Prior to ERISA, few cases involved employer attempts to deny 
private sector employees their otherwise vested retirement benefits 
as punishment for their misconduct or dishonesty, 146 rather than 
competitive behavior. However, in recent years, perhaps due to the 
growth of the private pension market, more cases have considered 
the former issue, and have generally upheld those provisions. 147 For 
the Robinson-Patman Act "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a 
result that it expressly declined to enact."); Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Comm'r, 146 F.2d 970, 972 
(6th Cir. 1945) ("It has long been a recognized rule of statutory construction that the omission 
by amendment, of qualifying language, discloses an intent to include the class previously 
excluded by the omitted qualifying language."). 
145. Lee, supra note 1, at 47. Apart from the portions of the legislative history discussed 
in the text that deal with explicit congressional preemption concerning vesting and bad boy 
clauses during the gap period, other parts of the legislative history would, under Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elev. Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), and Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 
624, 633 (1973), support a conclusion of implied preemption in view of: (1) the pervasiveness 
of federal regulation; (2) the objectives and effects of character of federal and state regulation; 
(3) the dominant national or federal interest in the field; and (4) the need for uniformity of 
regulation. The legislative history of ERISA clearly shows the presence of all of these factors, 
particularly the need for national uniformity in order to eliminate conflicting and inconsistent 
state regulation. 120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent), reprinted in m 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 4670. SeeS. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 
(1973). 
146. See, e.g., Lamphere v. Old Second Nat'! Bank, 39 Ill. App. 3d 610, 350 N.E.2d 272 
(1976); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 568 (1966). 
147. Taylor v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 70, 97 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1971); Bird v. Connect-
icut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 133 A.2d 894 (1957); White v. Crane Co., 147 So. 2d 32 (Ct. 
App. La. 1962); Marcus v. Boston Edison Co., 56 N.E.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1944); Gitelson 
v. Dupont, 17 N.Y.2d 46,215 N.E.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1966); Taint v. Kroger Co., 47 Ohio Op.2d 
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example, a California court 148 allowed a denial of benefits to a death 
beneficiary even though the acts of dishonesty in question were not 
discovered until after the participant's death. Moreover, in 1970, 
the Texas Supreme Court149 held that a retirement plan committee's 
determination of a participant's termination for dishonest conduct 
is conclusive absent a showing of a lack of good faith in the applica-
tion of the plan's provisions. 150 Lack of good faith was not shown by 
either the committee's reliance on an attorney's definition of dis-
honesty or in its failure to hold a hearing, because none was re-
quested since the participant admitted the conduct in question. 151 
However, recent decisions have construed "discharge for cause" bad 
boy clauses very narrowly. For example, where a former partici-
pant's embezzlement and disclosure of trade secrets were not dis-
covered until after termination of employment, his termination was 
not considered a "discharge for cause. " 152 Similarly, a provision for-
feiting an employee's vested interest upon "confessions" to a felony 
or misdemeanor was held to require "confession" in the strict crimi-
nallaw sense. 153 
Post-termination Competitive Behavior 
Most pre-ERISA litigation concerning divestitures of vested 
rights was generated by post-termination competitive behavior. 
Plans commonly provided that a participant's retirement benefits 
would be reduced or terminated if, after retirement or termination 
of employment, the participant engaged in conduct that was com-
272, 247 N.E.2d 794 (Ct. C.P. 1967); Ellis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 172 S.C. 338, 174 S.E. 
19 (1934). But see Leongard v. Metal & Thermit Corp., 204 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
See generally Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 
909, 917-18 (1970). Cf. Lieberman v. Cook, 343 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1972). 
148. Reese v. Administrative Comm. of Profit-Sharing Trust, 218 Cal. App.2d 646, 32 Cal. 
Rptr. 818 (1963). 
149. Neuhoff Bros. Packers Mgm't Corp. v. Wilson, 453 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1970). In 
Neuhoff, the profit-sharing plan: (1) mandated forfeiture of a participant's entire account 
balance in the event of termination for dishonest or fraudulent conduct; (2) granted to the 
plan committee authority to make all determinations concerning a particular participant's 
benefits; and (3) stated that the committee's decisions would be final, binding, and conclu-
sive on all parties. 
150. For a discussion of the validity of the court's standard of review in light of the 
prohibition against exculpatory clauses found in ERISA, § 410 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (a) 
(Supp. V 1975), see Lee, (ERISA)-Fiduciary Responsibilities and Prohibited Transactions, 
. A-37 (Tax Mgm't Portfolio number 308, 1975). 
151. 453 S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (1970); accord, Miller v. Asl'oc. Pension Trusts, Inc., 541 F.2d 
726, 729 (8th Cir. 1976). 
152. See Lamphere v. Old Second Nat'! Bank, 39 Ill. App. 3d 610, 350 N.E.2d 272 (197€); 
accord, Anger v. Bender, 31 Ill. App. 3d 877, 335 N.E.2d 122 (1975). 
153. Helzer v. Mountain States Motors, Inc., 535 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. Colo. 1975). 
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petitive with, or detrimental to, his former employer's business. 154 
The early cases often permitted forfeitures on the theory that a 
pension constituted a gratuity; thus, the employer could make or 
withhold these gratuitous pension payments as he chose. 155 More 
recently, however, virtually all of the authorities have recognized 
that retirement benefits, whether provided under a contributory or 
non-contributory retirement plan, 156 are in reality earned by the 
employee, since the payments are in lieu of compensation. Hence, 
pension benefits constitute deferred wages. 157 
1. Policy Considerations 
Unfortunately, a number of theories and approaches relied upon 
by courts sustained anticompetition retirement plan provisions but 
failed to address underlying policy questions. For example, some 
courts based their validations of forfeiture clauses upon factors such 
as whether the employee's interest vested periodically or only upon 
termination of employment, 158 and whether a participant had failed 
to comply with another contract provision, thereby empowering the 
employer to revoke its pension promise. 159 
2. "Employee's Choice" Rationale 
The majority of pre-ERISA cases upheld anticompetition clauses 
in retirement plans under an "employee's choice" rationale: such 
provisions place no restraint upon the freedom of the employee, 
because they do not prevent the employee from accepting employ-
ment with a competitor-he has a choice between the new job or the 
retirement benefits. 160 
154. See, e.g., Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1971); Keller v. 
Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F.Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Van Pelt v. Berefco, Inc., 
60 Ill. App. 2d 415, 308 N.E.2d 858, 865 (1965). 
155. Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 296. 
156. The terms "contributory" and "non-contributory" distinguish between those plans 
that provide benefits to participants regardless of investment of their own money in the 
funding vehicle and those plans which impose sanctions for a failure to so invest. See 
generally ERISA, § 204 (c) (2) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (c) (2) (C) (Supp. V 1975), where the 
term "mandatory contributions" is defined as "amounts contributed to the plan by the 
employee which are required as a condition of employment, as a condition of participation 
in such plan, or as a condition of obtaining benefits under the plan attributable to employer 
contributions." 
157. See authorities cited at note 50 supra. 
158. Koehn & Ptacek, supra note 53, at 83-88. 
159. Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 292. 
160. Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1971); accord, Bannert 
v. American Can Co., 525 F.2d 104, 109 (6th Cir. 1975); Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 
F.2d 838, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1975); Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 
(N.D. Ohio 1976); Miller v. Associated Pension Trusts, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 907, 911 (E.D. Mo. 
1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1976); Brown Stove Works, Inc. v. Kimsey, 119 Ga. App. 
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Commentators strongly criticized the employee's choice analy-
sis.181 Eventually, some courts162 voiced similar criticism: 
The idea that under such forfeiture provisions an employee has a 
real "freedom of choice" has been strongly criticized upon the 
ground that even under noncontributory pensions [sic] plans, 
benefit payments are no longer regarded as "gratuities," but as a 
contractual right to deferred compensation, and that these deci-
sions ignore the inhibitory effect of such a forfeiture clause upon 
an employee in making the decision whether to accept a new job, 
in that ordinarily the new employment will not compensate him 
for loss of the pension, which may represent a substantial portion 
of what he must depend upon when he retires and which he cannot 
risk by competing}83 
3. The "Reasonableness" Test 
Gradually, the pre-ERISA cases began to equate anticompetition 
clauses in retirement plans with those contained in employment 
contracts. These courts recognized that under the latter clause the 
employer was forced to employ legal sanctions against competing 
employees while under the former clause the employer could deny 
competing employees their retirement benefits. It was reasoned that 
"in either instance, the employee is subject to an economic loss 
should he breach the restrictive covenant."164 Though this position 
continued to be the minority view, 185 the significance ofthe equation 
453, 167 S.E.2d 693 (1969); Van Pelt v. Berefco, Inc., 60 ill. App.2d 415, 208 N.E.2d 858, 865 
(1965); Alco-Columbia Paper Serv., Inc. v. Nash, 273 So.2d 630, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1973); 
Alldredge v. City Nat'! Bank, 468 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1971); Dollgener v. Robertson Fleet Servs., 
Inc., 527 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246, 1251-55 
(1968). 
The employee choice doctrine, as it originated in New York, see Kristt v. Whelan, 4 A.D.2d 
195, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct. App. 1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 807, 181 N.Y.S.2d 205, 155 N.E.2d 
116 (1958), implied that such a forfeiture may never be examined for reasonableness. See 
Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671, 672 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The strength 
of this doctrine may have been somewhat eroded by subsequent decisions. See Golden v. 
Kentile Floor, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1975). 
161. See, e.g., Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 303; Case Note, 50 CoRNELL L.Q. 
672, 676-77 (1965). 
162. Compare, Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1971); Food Fair Stores, Inc. 
v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632 (1972); Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 
Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976); Harris v. Bolin, 247 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. 1976); Lavey v. 
Edwards, 264 Ore. 331, 505 P.2d 342, 345 (1973); Almers v. South Carolina Nat'! Bank, 217 
S.E.2d 135 (S.C. 1975); Sheppard v. Blackstock Lumber Co., 85 Wash.2d 929, 540 P.2d 1373 
(1975); Estate of Schroeder v. Gateway Transp. Co., 53 Wis.2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971); 
with authorities cited in note 147 supra, and Collister v. Board of Trustees of the McGee Co. 
Profit Sharing Plan, 531 P.2d 989 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Hudson v. North Carolina Farm 
Bureau, 23 N.C. App. 50, 209 S.E.2d 416 (1974). 
163. Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Ore. 33, 505 P.2d 342, 345 (1973). 
164. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632 (1972). 
165. See Almers v. South Carolina Nat'! Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135, 138 (S.C. 1970). 
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was threefold. First, in some jurisdictions, all anticompetition re-
strictions were statutorily voided as restraints on trade, at least 
where they were not necessary to protect the employer's interests. 166 
Second, under the common law in some states, the enforceability of 
contractual divestiture depended on the restraint's compliance with 
a "reasonableness" test, i.e., whether it was (1) necessary to protect 
the employer's interest in view of the detriment to the employee, 
and (2) not harmful to the public. 167 
Third, some jurisdictions, in applying the reasonableness stan-
dard, focused upon the potential injury to the public and, conse-
quently, voided bad boy clauses as being "so unreasonable as to be 
in violation of public policy."168 For example, the Iowa Supreme 
Court reasoned in Van Rosen u. Bankers Trust Co.: 169 
[W]hen a career employee retires, either voluntarily or involun-
tarily, he or she often experiences a traumatic economic change. 
Furthermore, many pensioners cannot, at the moment, qualify for 
social security and must resort to other employment for supple-
mentary income. Usually, in such cases, work openings in the em-
ployee's accustomed field of endeavor are not readily available. 
And if such a position is obtained, comparatively inconsequential 
or no attendant marginal benefits are ordinarily provided, or ulti-
mately acquired. 
* * * 
[W]hen retirement from any subsequent employment occurs 
the result can be chaotic, absent restoration of any pension rights 
166. Muggil v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107, 348 P.2d 
147, 18 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965); Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1971); Graham v. 
Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assoc., Inc., 540 P.2d 1161 (Okla. 1975); Holsen v. Marshall & 
llsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971). 
167. See Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Ore. 331, 505 P.2d 342 (1973); accord, Woodward v. 
Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976); Sheppard v. Blackstock 
Lumber Co., 85 Wash. 2d 929, 540 P.2d 1373 (1975). See generally Black, Employee Agree· 
ments not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (1960); Koehn & Ptacek, supra note 53 
at 92-93. The courts generally construe any ambiguity in favor of the former participant. See, 
e.g., Paddock Pool Constr'n Co. v. Monseur, 23 Ariz. App. 451, 533 P.2d 1188 (1975). 
168. Van Hosen v. Bankers Trust Co., 200 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1971); accord, Food Fair 
Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632 (1972); Woodward v. Cadillac Overall 
Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 250 N.W.2d 710, 721 (dissenting opinion) (1976); Almers v. South 
Carolina Nat'! Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135, 139 (S.C. 1975). The countervailing policy, under the 
majority view, is apparently based upon freedom of contract principles. Dollgener v. Robert-
son Fleet Services, Inc., 527 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). This approach, however, 
overlooks the disparate bargaining power of the employer and employees. Furthermore, it 
ignores the reality that many plans are not negotiated, but are unilaterally established by 
the employer. Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 395 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 
(dissenting opinion) (1976). 
169. 200 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1971). 
170. /d. at 508-09. 
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acquired through extended service with a prior employer. The 
harshness of such a situation is self-evident. 
Moreover, private pension plans have a humanitarian purpose 
in that, like employment security, they extend to those benefitted 
some degree of financial independence at a time when earning 
ability and related income may be impaired or ended . . . It is in 
tum evident these programs have become increasingly vital to our 
socioeconomic commun-ity welfare. By the same token society 
today has a material interest in the orderly development and ad-
ministration of all pension plans, public or private. Thus public 
policy comes into play. . . . 
It therefore follows, the infinite forfeiture and termination of all 
pension rights instantly acquired by plaintiff through prior affilia-
tion with defendant bank, merely by accepting employment with 
a competing institution, imposes an unjust and uncivic penalty on 
plaintiff at the same time disproportionately benefitting these de-
fendants. 170 
In those jurisdictions espousing the majority view that competi-
tive behavior bad boy clauses were not void as against public policy, 
commentators disagreed171 on the issue whether courts should re-
write unreasonable anticompetition clauses. The majority of the 
courts that considered the issue reformed such clauses, and enforced 
them when the employee's competitive conduct surpassed the 
ambit of a reasonable restraint. 172 In contrast, a frequent pre-ERISA 
statutory approach was to void entirely unreasonable anti-
competitive clauses, rather than to allow enforcement of the reason-
able portion. 173 
4. Time of Payment Considerations 
When pre-ERISA bad boy clauses were voided, questions arose 
concerning the appropriate time for payment of vested plan bene-
fits. Frequently, under pre-ERISA retirement plans, benefit pay-
ments did not begin until a terminated or retired employee reached 
normal retirement age. On rare occasions, when the plan committee 
171. Compare Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 299, with Koehn & Ptacek, supra 
note 53, at 94. This approach would parallel the common law approach toward general anti-
competition clauses in employment contracts. Forfeiture of Benefits, supra note 50, at 299. 
172. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1971); Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Ore. 331, 505 
P.2d 342 (1973); Sheppard v. Blackstock Lumber Co., 85 Wash.2d 929, 540 P.2d 1373 (1975). 
Contra, Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976); 
Harris v. Bolin, 247 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. 1976). 
173. See Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976) 
("It is also significant that some states have promulgated statutes which specifically limit 
the validity of non-competition forfeitures. Moreover, under these statutes, unlimited non-
competition forfeiture clauses have invariably been held invalid."). 
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or trustee unsucc·essfully attempted to divest a terminated em-
ployee of his vested benefits a question remained whether he would 
be entitled to receive his benefits earlier than scheduled. For exam-
ple, in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 174 the plan provided that 
a participant who voluntarily terminated his employment would 
not be eligible to receive benefit payments until normal retire-
ment. However, the Maryland Supreme Court ruled that a former 
participant who had not reached that age was entitled to imme-
diate payment where his account balance had been wrongfully for-
feited for alleged competitive activities and transferred to the ac-
counts of the remaining participants. After invalidating the anti-
competition clause as impermissibly broad, the court reasoned that 
the transfer of the participant's account balance constituted a com-
mingling of his allocated assets with the general plan fund, thus 
amounting to a conversion which entitled him to immediate recov-
ery of their value. While possibly justifiable on public policy 
grounds, this approach ignores the realities facing modern retire-
ment plans: even in individual account plans funds are usually 
commingled. Only in the trustee's records are separate accounts 
established. 
However, the legal theory adopted by the Greeley court appears 
to be determinative in this area. Thus in Bird v. Computer Technol-
ogy, Inc., 175 the terminated employee argued that the employer's 
stated intent not to pay him any benefits even when he reached 
normal retirement age constituted a repudiation and anticipatory 
breach of the pension promise. The court denied the plaintiff's re-
quest for immediate payment because under local law an anticipa-
tory breach did not entitle plaintiff to acceleration of future install-
ment payments of money. 176 In most states, however, a terminated 
employee could treat such an anticipatory repudiation as a breach 
of contract and receive the actuarial present value of his retirement 
benefits. 177 
Another common plan feature allows a discretionary deferral of 
payment of a terminated participant's vested benefits until normal 
retirement age. The object of this approach is to preclude an em-
ployee from terminating employment and using his plan benefits to 
174. 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632, 640 (1972). 
175. 364 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
176. Id. at 1345 ("[T)he doctrine of anticipatory breach has no application [under New 
York law) to contracts for the payment of money only, in installments or otherwise."). 
177. See Minnesota Amusement Co. v. Larking, 299 F.2d 142, 153 (8th Cir. 1962); Stop-
ford v. Boonton Molding Co., 56 N.J. 169, 265 A.2d 657 (1970); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 464 
(1972). 
168 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 9 
finance a competitive business. But, in one pre-ERISA case, 178 the 
fiduciaries' decision to withhold payment of the terminated partici-
pant's vested benefits until normal retirement age was held an 
abuse of discretion, since the decision was motivated solely by the 
fiduciaries' fear that the employee would compete with his former 
employer. 
The interplay of the pre-ERISA state law concerning bad boy 
clauses with the policies underlying ERISA may now be examined 
in an effort to discern the viability of such forfeiture clauses during 
the gap period. 
ERISA COMMON LAw 
The district court in Amory fashioned its own "reasonableness 
test" for construing bad boy clauses. In light of the public policy 
expressed in the legislative history of ERISA, at a minimum the 
standard for bad boy clauses should be rigorous: they should be 
presumed unreasonable unless the plan administrator carries the 
burden of proving otherwise. The Amory court concluded that the 
following questions would have to be considered. 
[I)n light of such reasonableness standard: 
1. Were the textual provisions of the contract reasonable m 
scope? 
2. Were those provisions, if reasonable, properly applied? 
3. Was it conscionable to have a decision concerning forfeiture 
made by persons in a position to profit at plaintiff's expense, and 
if so, what remedies are now open to the respective parties? 179 
However, the court noted that the third factor might cease to be 
important, since, under emerging federal common law, the em-
ployer has the burden of proving the forfeiture provision was reason-
ably applied regardless of the plan committee's good faith or lack 
thereof. 180 
178. Martinez v. Alto Employees' Trust, 273 So.2d 735 (La. Ct. App. 1972). The court 
reasoned that deferring payment because of a fear of competitive employment conflicted with 
the trustee's duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary-a statutory 
obligation in Louisiana, but equally the rule under common law. See Blankenship v. Boyle, 
329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971). Subsequently, the Louisiana courts held that a fiduciary, 
in exercising its discretion to make a lump-sum or deferred payment, must examine the 
financial picture of the participant and make its decision based upon whether the partici-
pant's best interests would be served by an immediate or deferred payment. Deichman v. Alto 
Employees' Trust, 332 So.2d 582, 587 (La. Ct. App. 1976). But see Joy Mfg. Co. v. Stohl, 137 
Ga. App. 109, 222 S.E.2d 888 (1975) (misapplying Pennsylvania law as to right of employer 
to change inchoate retirement benefits). 
179. 434 F. Supp. 671, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (footnote omitted). 
180. /d. at 673 n.2. One court has described the common plan pattern of employing major 
officer-shareholders to administer the plan trust as having "the appearance of a cozy arrange-
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A dissenting opinion by Justice Williams181 from the recent Michi-
gan Supreme Court decision in Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Sup-
ply Co. 182 adopts an approach virtually identical to that in Amory, 
and provides some insight into the rationales behind it. Justice 
Williams carefully reviewed the judicial treatment of noncompeti-
tion forfeiture clauses in other jurisdictions and concluded that 
Michigan courts should subject those clauses to "strict scrutiny," 
i.e., both the language of the clause and the application of the 
restraint should be reasonable.l83 Moreover, the employer would 
have the burden of showing that the restraint is valid under the 
traditional reasonableness test.l84 That burden would be carried 
only by proof that a noncompetition clause: (1) extends no greater 
than is necessary for the protection of the legitimate interest of the 
employer; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee; and 
(3) is not injurious to the interest of the public. 185 
Justice Williams justified his "strict scrutiny" -an equivalent to 
the presumption of unreasonableness in Amory-on the grounds 
that: (1) employer overreaching is invited during the establishment 
of most retirement plans because of an imbalance in bargaining 
ment." Miller v. Associated Pension Trusts, Inc., 541 F.2d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1976). 
181. 396 Mich. 379, 384, 240 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1976). Justice Williams was joined in his 
dissent by Chief Justice Kavanagh. 
182. 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976). The Woodward litigation resulted from the 
Cadillac Overall's plan committee's termination of the otherwise 100% vested pension rights 
of certain employees. After a class action suit was filed, the defendants argued their action 
was justified by the plan's anticompetition bad boy clause. Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, based upon a statute prohibiting covenants not to compete, MtcH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 445.761 (1965), was denied by the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court's affirm-
ance of that denial and remand of the case was based solely on a prior narrow judicial 
interpretation given the statute, analogous to the employer's choice rationale. The majority 
opinion, however, closed with the caveat: "Appellant's other arguments are not properly 
presented for our consideration by this motion for summary judgment but depend upon facts 
which must be developed at trial." Id. at 384, 240 N.W.2d at 711. 
This was a case of first impression in Michigan. Six months earlier, the Sixth Circuit had 
"applied" Michigan law, concluding that Michigan courts would not adopt the "employee's 
choice" rationale and consequently, would not find an unlimited bad boy clause unreasona-
ble. Bannert v. American Can Co., 525 F.2d 104, 110 (6th Cir. 1975). However, since only a 
distinct minority of the states have addressed the issue of bad boy clauses in retirement plans, 
and since there are two conflicting lines of authority in the area, it is risky for federal courts 
to guess what a state court would hold in a case of first impression. This is another justifica-
tion for creation of ERISA common law which would govern both during and after the interim 
period. 
183. 396 Mich. at 402, 240 N.W.2d at 715 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
184. /d. at 403, 240 N.W.2d at 715. The dissent pointed out that "[p]lacing the burden 
on the employer is sensible not only due to the strict scrutinizing given employee restraints, 
but also because the employer has a more complete view of the interests of the business than 
an employee, and thus is in a better position to show a restraint is no more burdensome than 
needed to protect the employer's legitimate interest." /d. at 402 n.l7, 240 N.W.2d at 720 n.17. 
185. 396 Mich. at 402, 240 N. W .2d at 715. 
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power; (2) a forfeiture clause is not necessary since the employer 
already obtains consideration from the employee in the form of his 
continued services; and (3) noncom petition· forfeiture clauses 
usually affect a far wider range of people than do covenants not to 
compete ancillary to the sale of a business. In this context, it was 
noted that ERISA establishes a federal policy regarding noncompe-
tition forfeiture clauses: 
The central thrust of the new act is to encourage the creation of 
private retirement plans through tax incentives and to protect the 
employee's rights under these plans. Under the act, benefits must 
vest within certain prescribed time limitations ... Once the right 
to benefits vests, it cannot be forfeited with certain exceptions not 
applicable to this case. Specifically, Congress provided that under 
the act, a vested right is not to be forfeited because the employee 
later went to work for a competitor .188 
It would appear that under Amory a noncompetition forfeiture 
clause which is unreasonable in its language, albeit reasonable in 
application, will not be enforced. Justice Williams' dissent in 
Woodward pointed out: (1) an unreasonably broad noncompetition 
forfeiture clause has an in terrorem effect upon employees who com-
ply with the overbroad restraint; (2) many employees whose benefits 
are forfeited upon an unreasonable application of such a clause 
never reach the courts; (3) "an overbroad clause heightens the ill-
effect of non-competition forfeiture clauses on the public interest 
determining competition and employee mobility even where it 
serves no legitimate interest of the employer;" 187 and (4) enforce-
186. /d. at 403, 240 N.W.2d at 716-17 (citations and footnotes omitted). The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court similarly found the ERISA legislative history of great assistance in 
reaching its conclusion that a bad boy clause is unenforceable, absent reasonable temporal 
and geographic limitations. Almers v. South Carolina National Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135, 139 
(S.C. 1975). 
187. 396 Mich. at 404, 240 N.W.2d at 719. Justice Williams contrasted a bad boy forfeiture 
clause in a retirement plan with a covenant not to compete ancillary to sale of a business: 
a non-competition forfeiture clause is not necessary for the employer to get the 
major value of what he pays for in entering into an employment contract and 
establishing a retirement program, i.e., the continued services of his employees and 
the tax benefits granted businesses establishing retirement programs. Refusal to 
enforce an overbroad non-competition forfeiture clause does not, therefore, grossly 
distort the overall agreement between employer and employees. 
ld. at 404, 240 N.W.2d at 720. 
In contrast, the employee's choice cases, in upholding bad boy clauses, reasoned that these 
forfeiture provisions were supported by reasonable business justifications that clearly out-
weighed any potential harm to the competing former employee. "It was designed to protect 
Graphic Systems and its employees from competition by former employees who attempt at 
the same time to share the benefits of profits earned by faithful employees whom the plan 
seeks to reward for their services." Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F.Supp. 1005, 1012 
(N.D. Ohio 1976); accord, Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 846 (5th Cir. 1975); 
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ment of such a clause encourages employers to continue to use over-
broad languag~ to the detriment of the public interest. 188 These 
consequences are important reasons for a court's refusal to enforce 
an unreasonably worded forfeiture clause. 
Federal common law derived from ERISA and its underlying pub-
lic policy should govern the validity of bad boy clauses during the 
interim period. However, state law, to the extent it accords with and 
furthers ERISA objectives, may be incorporated into federal com-
mon law. Thus, it must be determined to what degree the state 
doctrine of "reasonableness" is consistent with ERISA policy. 
·The Amory court, by adopting a reasonableness test similar to 
that used by the various states, indicated its belief that this stan-
dard is consonant with ERISA. Insofar as application of the test 
results in decreased forfeitures of vested benefits, it is indeed consis-
tent with federal policy. Nevertheless, a reasonableness standard 
would still allow forfeitures of vested benefits if the bad boy clause 
was reasonably worded and applied. A question therefore remains 
whether the reasonableness approach truly furthers the ERISA pol· 
icy against forfeiture of vested benefits. In short, does ERISA policy 
require prohibition of all bad boy clauses? If so, does this prohibition 
extend to bad boy forfeitures of rights vested in excess of ERISA's 
minimum standards? 
Case analysis of the legislative policy underlying ERISA supports 
a total ban of bad boy forfeitures during the interim period. For 
example, in Almers v. South Carolina National Bank of 
Charleston, 189 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered a for-
feiture clause in a pre-ERISA profit-sharing plan which provided 
that a participant would lose his vested benefits upon accepting 
employment with a competitor. While ultimately ruling that forfei-
ture clauses without reasonable temporal and geographic limita-
tions are invalid, the Almers court analyzed Congress' approach in 
enacting ERISA. The court observed that Congress had concluded 
that forfeitability of pension and profit sharing retirement income 
interfered with the mobility of labor to the detriment of the econ-
omy. Therefore, under ERISA a vested benefit would no longer be 
Miller v. Associated Pension Trusts, 396 F. Supp. 907, 911 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 
727 (8th Cir. 1976). ("Such a provision is designed to protect the integrity of the plan, and is 
therefore valid since any competitive actions on the part of a former employee would in all 
probability have a detrimental effect upon the profit sharing aspect of the plan."). 
188. The Woodward dissent concluded that an overbroad forfeiture clause, i.e., without 
temporal or geographic restrictions, either unnegotiated or negotiated when the employee was 
substantially disadvantaged in bargaining power will always be unreasonable, since an over-
broad provision is "contrary to the public interest." 396 Mich. at 403, 240 N.W.2d at 721. 
189. 217 S.E.2d 135 (S.C. 1975). 
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forfeitable merely because the employee later went to work for a 
competitor or was disloyal to the employer. "Congress noted that it 
was in the public interest to have a portable working class, un-
impeded by forfeiting provisions. Congress has concluded, and we 
think properly so, that the spectre of financial prostration upon 
retirement due to forfeitable rights effectively deters employees 
from accepting competitive employment."190 The court noted that 
from this premise, it would follow that forfeiture provisions should 
always be declared void. 
Furthermore, state and federal courts which have analyzed the 
ERISA minimum vesting provisions have concluded that bad boy 
forfeiture clauses will be void after the effective date of those provi-
sions.191 Thus, there is no logical reason why bad boy clauses should 
not be voided as well during the interim period after state law is 
preempted. This result would not be contrary to the congressional 
purpose behind the delay in the effective date of the nonforfeita-
bility provisions. As noted earlier, the purpose of the delay is to 
grant employers adequate time to obtain insurance of their funds to 
comply with the vesting standards. 192 Voiding anticompetition 
clauses should not increase costs for either defined benefit or defined 
contribution plans, since it is unlikely that plan actuaries include 
amounts due to bad boy forfeitures when calculating plan sponsor 
contributions. 193 
It would also be consistent with ERISA policy to void bad boy 
forfeitures of benefits vested in excess of the minimum. However, 
these forfeitures are allowed under the Treasury's interpretation of 
the literal language of the statute. Because it can be expected that 
190. ld. at 139 (citations omitted). 
191. See Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (N.D. Ohio 1976); 
Amory v. Boyden Associates, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Woodward v. Cadillac 
Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976); Almers v. South Carolina Nat'! 
Bank, 217 S.E.2d 135 (S.C. 1975). 
192. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
193. The plan actuary generally employs "actuarial assumptions" to discount in advance, 
from the employer contributions needed to provide a participant's benefit at normal retire-
ment age, some or all of the following factors: (1) preretirement mortality; (2) investment 
experience or "interest"; (3) expense of administration, if not paid by plan sponsor; (4) 
turnover of employees, i.e., separation from service prior to full vesting or prior to full accrual 
of the maximum benefit under the plan; and (5) projected changes in compensation. Lee, 
Joint and Survivor Annuities under ERISA-The Gamble on Survival, 3 J. CoRP. TAX. 241, 
244 n. 8 (1976). The author understands that actuaries generally do not discount in advance 
for divestitures due to violation of bad boy clauses. Hence a ban on bad boy clauses would 
not give rise to an "experience loss" which occurs when the fund's actual experience is less 
favorable than had been anticipated or "assumed" by the actuary. Potentially, both changes 
in actuarial assumptions and experience loss can increase employer costs without resulting 
in increased benefit levels. 
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smaller plans will commonly provide for greater vested benefits 
than ERISA requires, 194 it can aiso be expected that a great deal of 
litigation involving bad boy forfeitures of the excess benefits will 
arise. Thus, a desirable legislative resolution would be to clearly 
articulate the policy concerning excess benefit forfeitures. 
CoNcLUsioN 
With the advent of ERISA, litigation over the enforceability of 
bad boy clauses-in recent years the most frequent pension issue in 
state courts-will shift to the federal courts. The contradiction of 
ERISA legislative history on its face prohibiting bad boy clauses 
and Treasury approval of these clauses in restricted though not 
infrequent circumstances, in addition to increased awareness by 
retirement plan participants of their ERISA rights, 195 should spur a 
wave of litigation in this area, already foreshadowed by Keller and 
Amory. If the courts do not adopt the suggested approach of invali-
dating all bad boy clauses after January 1, 1975, as contrary to 
federal public policy, they are likely to become caught up in the 
never ending task of determining whether such a clause and its 
application are reasonable. Moreover, in that event, overly broad 
bad boy clauses would continue to have their in terrorem effect 
while aggrieved participants would be precluded from coming into 
court, or from obtaining adequate representation once in court, due 
to the small dollar amount of their claims. For these reasons, the 
Department of Labor should shut the post-ERISA pandora's box 
opened by the Treasury by strongly and promptly articulating the 
public policy considerations militating against any enforcement of 
bad boy clauses. 
194. Many existing smaller plans will, in order to meet the requirements of Rev. Proc. 
75-49, 1975-1 C.B. 584, as modified by Rev. Proc. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B.550, either maintain their 
existing pre-ERISA vesting schedule, which is usually more rapid than the ERISA mini-
mums, see Credited Service, supra note 44, at 369-70, or grant the greater of the existing 
schedule or the four-forty rule to existing participants while using the four-forty rule alone 
for future participants. In both instances, limitation of the bad boy clause to members of the 
prohibited group will eliminate § 401 (a) (4) discrimination in operation problems. Thus, 
vested rights in excess of the ERISA minimum standards will undoubtedly exist in a large 
number of plans for a period after the 1976 calendar year. It should be noted that more than 
two-thirds of the 473,272 private pensions plans in 1975 had 10 or less participants. However, 
90% of all participants were covered by fairly large plans. Department of Labor News Release 
76-1403 (Nov. 12, 1976). 
195. Department of Labor regulations require that the summary plan description, which 
must be given to plan participants, contain a statement of the participants' "ERISA rights." 
Lab. Reg. § 2520.102-3 (t), 42 Fed. Reg. 37,182 (July 19, 1977). 

